Accountability at the Fed and the ECB
Analiżi fil-Fond
30-09-2020
This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Analiżi fil-Fond
Awtur estern
Karl WHELAN
Dwar dan id-dokument
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