Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case
In-Depth Analysis
29-09-2020
The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
In-Depth Analysis
External author
Charles WYPLOSZ
About this document
Publication type
Keyword
- central bank
- documentation
- economic conditions
- economic geography
- ECONOMICS
- EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
- EU institutions and European civil service
- Europe
- European Central Bank
- European Parliament
- EUROPEAN UNION
- FINANCE
- financial stability
- free movement of capital
- GEOGRAPHY
- inflation
- monetary economics
- operation of the Institutions
- political framework
- political geography
- POLITICS
- politics and public safety
- public opinion
- research report
- single monetary policy
- supervisory power
- Switzerland