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When Jean Monnet first devised what became known as the Schuman Plan, named after French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, it did not even include a parliamentary assembly. When the Common Assembly was subsequently created for the European Coal and Steel Community, it consisted of delegates from national parliaments who had only limited and ineffective supervisory powers. Despite its humble origins, however, the delegates succeeded in establishing long-term trajectories that were crucial for the Common ...

Aiming to secure peace in Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, the Schuman Declaration proposed cooperation among European countries in two key economic areas central to rearmament and warfare: coal and steel. As an institutional framework for this cooperation, the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of the first supranational organisation in Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Established in 1952, the ECSC laid the foundations for today's European Union (EU). ...

Political groups in the European Parliament contribute greatly to the institution's supranational character and are a most important element of its parliamentary work. Moreover, the Parliament's political groups have proven to be crucial designers of EU politics and policies. However, when the forerunner of today's Parliament, the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was established in 1952, the creation of political groups was not envisaged at all. Making use of its autonomy with ...

The ECSC Treaty, which was concluded for a period of 50 years from its entry into force, expired on 23 July 2002. Accordingly, in the run-up to its expiry, and in view of the benefits which the coal and steel sectors derived from the ECSC research and technological development programmes, the European Council, in the resolution on growth and employment which it adopted in Amsterdam on 16 and 17 June 1997, determined that revenues from reserves outstanding at the expiry of the Treaty should be used ...

This study is the first part of a series which will analyse inter-institutional relations in the budgetary domain, with a particular focus on the evolution of the role of the European Parliament. The ECSC and its budget was a very interesting case with its specific features – autonomy of the executive, a fiscal mechanism, and the capacity to contract loans and lend money. Was this approach successful? Why were these mechanisms not replicated in the European Community? To what extent did the struggles ...