Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case
Analyse approfondie
29-09-2020
The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Analyse approfondie
Auteur externe
Charles WYPLOSZ
À propos de ce document
Type de publication
Mot-clé
- banque centrale
- Banque centrale européenne
- cadre politique
- documentation
- Europe
- FINANCES
- fonctionnement institutionnel
- GÉOGRAPHIE
- géographie politique
- géographie économique
- inflation
- institutions de l'Union européenne et fonction publique européenne
- libre circulation des capitaux
- opinion publique
- Parlement européen
- politique monétaire unique
- pouvoir de contrôle
- rapport de recherche
- situation économique
- stabilité financière
- Suisse
- UNION EUROPÉENNE
- VIE POLITIQUE
- vie politique et sécurité publique
- ÉCONOMIE
- économie monétaire
- ÉDUCATION ET COMMUNICATION