Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case
Analiżi fil-Fond
29-09-2020
The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Analiżi fil-Fond
Awtur estern
Charles WYPLOSZ
Dwar dan id-dokument
Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni
Kelma għat-tiftix
- bank ċentrali
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